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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 890652-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

s

CHRISTOPHER GRAY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1990); assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990); and unlawful detention, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was defendant denied his sixth amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel?

Review of this issue is based

on a determination whether counsel's performance was deficient
and whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
2.

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to

sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, assault
-1-

and unlawful detention?

Review of this issue compels this Court

to view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict.

This Court may not

reverse a jury verdict unless it determines that the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crimes of which he was convicted.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).

Accord State

v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Christopher Gray, was charged on December
30, 1988, with one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990), and ten
counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at
6-8).

On January 27, 1989, six of the ten original aggravated

assault counts were reduced by an amended information to assault,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1990) (R. at 11).

From July 26 through 28, 1989, a jury trial

was held in the district court (R. at 119-127).

At the close of

the State's evidence the parties entered into a stipulation
consolidating the counts against defendant into three separate
charges:

Count I, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony,

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990); Count II,

-2-

aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990); and Count III, assault, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) (R.
at 132; Transcript, December 27, 1989 [hereinafter T2.] at 152155).

Guilty verdicts were returned on counts II and III (R. at

232-233).

Defendant was found guilty of a lesser included

offense of count I, unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1990) (R. at 231). On
October 2, 1989, defendant was sentenced to two 6 month terms for
counts I and III and an indeterminate term of zero to five years
for count II to be served consecutively in the Utah State Prison
(R. at 244-249).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 6, 1988, the victim, Nancy Gray, had lunch
with a co-worker, Debra Jean Dokos (Transcript, December 26,
1989, [hereinafter Tl.] at 78, 152; T2. at 70). While she was at
lunch, Nancy received a phone call from defendant (Tl. at 80).
When Nancy returned his call a short while later, defendant told
her he was upset that she had gone to lunch without first calling
him to see if it was okay (Tl. at 80, 153). That same afternoon,
at approximately 3:30 p.m., defendant picked Nancy up from her
work as a computer programmer and drove her to a part-time job

The transcript of defendant's trial is contained in three
volumes, one for each day of trial. The transcript for the
second day of trial, December 27, 1989, is designated as T2; the
designations will be Tl for December 26, 1989 and T3 for December
28, 1989.
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interview (Tl. at 81-83).

Defendant and Nancy did not talk to

each other from the time he picked her up until they reached the
interview at 13th South and State Street (Tl. at 82, 154). As
Nancy climbed out of the truck, defendant yelled at her to find
out how long she would be because he would not wait for her (Tl.
at 82).

When Nancy came back out of the building to tell

defendant how long the interview would take, he had the stereo
playing loudly and refused to either look at Nancy or roll down
the window to let her give him an answer (Tl. at 82). After the
interview, Nancy waited an hour for defendant to pick her up
before finally taking a cab to their apartment at 2003 Fallwood
Drive (Tl. 82-83, 155-156).

Upon her return home, Nancy met

defendant on his way out the door (Tl. at 84, 155-156).
Defendant told Nancy that he was very upset and angary and that he
needed to get out of the house for a while (Tl. at 84).

Nancy

remained at the apartment by herself and went to bed at 10:00
p.m. (Tl. at 84).
Early the next morning, December 7, 1988, at
approximately 2:30 a.m., Nancy was awakened by defendant when he
walked into the bedroom where she was sleeping and flipped on the
light (Tl. at 85).

Defendant, who had been drinking, angrily

picked up the telephone and handed it to Nancy telling her to
call Dokos so he could double check whether she had had lunch
with Nancy the day before (Tl. at 85, 157-60).

When Nancy

responded that she did not have Dokos's home phone number,
2
Defendant and Nancy shared the use of Nancy's 1988 Toyota
pickup truck, purchased by Nancy prior to their marriage on July
24, 1988, as defendant did not have a vehicle of his own.
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defendant became angry and threw the telephone receiver at her,
striking Nancy in the leg (Tl. at 86).

Nancy asked defendant to

stop, whereupon he again handed her the phone and told Nancy to
call Dokos (Tl. at 86).

This time Nancy reminded defendant that

he had thrown Dokos's home telephone number away during a prior
altercation (Tl. at 86).

Defendant became angered and threw the

receiver at Nancy again, striking her in the right arm (Tl. at
86-87; State's exhibit #15). At this point, Nancy began to cry
and plead with defendant to stop (Tl. at 87).

Defendant

responded by throwing the receiver at her a third time, striking
Nancy in the left hip (Tl. at 87, 160; Transcript, December 28,
1989 [hereinafter T3.] at 37; State's exhibit #14).
Defendant then sat down on the edge of the bed and
asked Nancy how long she had been at lunch (Tl. at 88). Nancy
told him that she was not sure, reminding defendant that he had
broken her watch during a previous argument (Tl. at 88). With
this explanation, defendant demanded to see the watch and
attempted to wind it before becoming even angrier and flipping
the metal watchband in Nancy's eye, blinding her for several
hours (Tl. at 88-89; T3. at 41; State's exhibits #8, #11 and
#12).

Crying, Nancy pleaded with defendant to stop; instead, he

slugged her forehead, cutting her with the rings on his right
hand and twisted her left forearm, threatening to break it (Tl.
at 89-90; State's exhibits #11-#13).

As Nancy tried to pull

away, defendant reached over and began choking her stating, "I
have to teach you who is boss in this family.
who to obey and who to listen to" (Tl. at 90).

-5-

You have to learn

Nancy watched as defendant took her .22 Beretta from
the nightstand near the bed and began playing with the bullets
(Tl. at 91-93)•

Defendant wondered out loud, "What if I forgot

how many bullets are in this gun?" and then held the gun to
Nancy's head, pulling the trigger (Tl. at 94, 166). Ignoring
Nancy's pleas to stop, defendant slapped her and told Nancy to
"shut up" or it would get worse (Tl. at 95). Defendant hit Nancy
in the head with the butt of the gun several times, stating that
he had to hit her to get her attention (Tl. at 95, 167).
Ordering Nancy to open her mouth, defendant then forced the
barrel of the gun into Nancy's mouth and held it there for
approximately two minutes telling her to lie very still or the
"hairy trigger" would go off (Tl. at 96). After defendant
removed the gun from her mouth, Nancy attempted to sit up and get
away, blocking defendant's blow to her chest with her right hand
(Tl. at 96-97, 168; State's exhibits #7 and #10).

Once defendant

gained control of Nancy, he forced the gun barrel into her mouth
a second time and again threatened to teach her who was boss (Tl.
at 97). Defendant told Nancy to "Make your peace with God"
because they were both going out that night (Tl. at 97).
Defendant stated, "I won't go to jail for you, bitch," and told
Nancy that after he killed her, he would take his own life (Tl.
at 97).
After threatening to kill her, defendant told Nancy
that he wanted to have sex and that if she refused he would "take
it" (Tl. at 98). Standing in front of her, defendant ordered
Nancy to undress and get back into the bed (Tl. at 98).

-6-

Defendant then forced Nancy to have anal and oral sex with him
(Tl

a/t , 99-100; T2. at 3-4), when she begged him to stop,

defendant forced Nancy to drink his urine, slapping and pulling
her hair when she tried to refuse (Tl. at 100; T2. at 5 ) .
Defendant next ordered Nancy to get out of bed and
crawl into the living room (Tl. at 101). As she did so,
defendant pulled Nancy's hair with his hands, lifting her from
the floor and dragging her to the kitchen where he hit her head
into the cupboard twice (Tl. at 101-102).

After hitting her head

into the kitchen cupboard, defendant dragged Nancy into the
living room and told her to lie on her back with her legs spread
toward him (Tl. at 102). As Nancy cried, defendant sat in a
chair opposite her holding a lighted cigarette lighter between
Nancy's legs and threatened to burn her if she moved (Tl. at 102103; T2. at 5 ) . Telling her that it would get worse if she did
not shut up, defendant picked up a candle approximately one foot
long and three inches wide and told Nancy he was going to shove
the candle up her vagina (Tl. at 103; T2. at 5-6). When Nancy
pleaded with him to stop, defendant kicked Nancy in her vagina
(Tl. at 103-104; T2. at 6 ) . Doubling his fist, defendant told
Nancy he wanted to see if it would fit inside her vagina and then
put his fist between her legs as if he were going to insert it
(Tl. at 104; T2, at 6) .
After threatening Nancy with his fist, defendant
nrdered her back onto her hands and knees (Tl

at 106). Coming

up behind Nancy, defendant inserted his fingers into her rectum,
grabbed the muscle and lifted Nancy off the floor (Tl. at 106;
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T2. at 7-8). When she screamed, defendant threatened Nancy again
that if she made any more noise, it would get worse (Tl. at 106).
He then pulled on her rectum a second time, lifting Nancy off the
floor again (Tl. at 106-107; T2. at 7-8). Apparently, defendant
then punched Nancy in the stomach and kicked her in the ribs
before forcing her to crawl to the bathroom where he ordered
Nancy to crawl into the bathtub and proceeded to urinate on her
(Tl. at 107; T2. at 8-10).

Following this, defendant again

forced Nancy to drink his urine, slapping her when she attempted
to spitsit out (Tl. at 108; T2. at 13). Defendant then pushed
Nancy down into the tub while he filled it with cold water,
telling her she was not to get out or he would "blow her brains
out" (Tl. at 108; T2. at 13-14).

Before leaving the bathroom

defendant threatened to blow Nancy's brains out if she moved and
turned on the bathroom fan and air conditioner telling her, "This
is so you will just be nice and comfortable" (Tl. at 109; T2. at
14).

While lying in the tub over the next several hours, Nancy

could hear defendant pacing outside the bathroom door (Tl. at
109; T2. at 14-15).

Off and on through the remainder of the

night, defendant would burst through the bathroom door to see if
Nancy had moved (Tl. at 109-110; T2. at 15-16).
The next morning, December 7, 1989, defendant allowed
Nancy out of the tub and told her to get back into bed (Tl. at
110; T2. at 17).

Defendant remained approximately one or two

feet behind Nancy as he walked her down the hall to the bedroom
(Tl. at 110). Stating that he wanted to have sex again,
defendant ordered Nancy into bed where he forced her to have
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vaginal sex (Tl. at 111; T2. at 18).

When he was through,

defendant fuM NatK-y • I'" nvidf him sick and that he wanted nothing
more to do with her (Tl. *.t' 111). Defendant then gave Nancy a
white pill about the size of an aspirin and told her it would
help her relax | T) , a\

111; 'I1.11

at 19).

After Nancy took the

pill, defendant held a gun on her and ordered her to call her
office and tell them she would not be coming in (Tl. at 111-112;
T2. at 20, 48). Defendant then forced her back into bed with
himf wrapping his arms around her so tightly that she could not
move (Tl. at 112-113; T2. at 23).

When Nancy awoke several hours

later at approximately 6:00 p.m., defendant came into the bedroom
and told her to shower and clean up (Tl. at 113; T2. at 21).
After Nancy showered, defendant stood in the doorway of
the bathroom and ordered her into the living room (Tl. at 114).
Telling her that she had "fucked up again," defendant sat with
his arm around Nancy until they went to bed later that evening
(Tl. at 115-116).

As he had done the night before, defendant

wrapped his arms around Nancy preventing any movement by her (Tl.
at 117).
When Nancy awoke the morning of December 8, defendant
was already up and dressed (Tl. at 117). Defendant stated that
since he could not hurt her any more "emotionally," he would do
it "physically" (Tl. at 118). Again, holding a gun on her,
defendant ordered Nancy to call her office a second time and
threatened that if she ever went for help he would "hunt" her
down and "kill" her (Tl. at 120; T2. at 48).

Vowing to make

Nancy's life miserable, defendant stated he was going to have a
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"good time" and act as though he were single by bringing women
home (Tl. at 120). Defendant then ordered Nancy to start
cleaning the apartment and made sure she was always within his
eyesight, "dogging" her every move with his pistol tucked into
the waistband of his pants (Tl. at 121-122; T2. at 24). Towards
evening, defendant allowed Nancy to eat a "few bites" of stew and
announced he was going out that night to find some women (Tl. at
123).

At approximately 8:30 p.m., while defendant was in the

shower and after making sure he had soap on his face, Nancy ran
down the hall grabbing her purse, coat, and some gold jewelry
defendant had purchased on her credit card (Tl. at 124). She
escaped to the truck and drove around for a while before stopping
at a grocery store where she purchased a comb, toothbrush and
other personal items (Tl. at 129). Because defendant had
threatened to kill her family if she asked them for help, Nancy
drove to the home of an old friend, Victoria Marks, whom she had
not seen for a few years and whom defendant had never met (Tl. at
127-129; T2. at 26-27, 32-33, 53-57).

When Nancy arrived at

Marks' apartment, Marks noticed bruises around Nancy's eyes and
that Nancy appeared tense and scared (T2. at 54-55).
The next day, December 9, 1989, Nancy met with Dokos
who also noticed the bruises on Nancy's hip, eye, arm and head
(T2. at 96).

Dokos accompanied Nancy to the Alta View Emergency

Room where Nancy was examined by Dr. Thomas Weed (Tl. at 99;
State's exhibit #21). Dr. Weed found several contusions and
tender spots which appeared to have been caused when Nancy was
choked and struck on the head, chest, back and hand by defendant
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(T2. at 102, 111-112; State's exhibits #7-#8, #10-#16).

Although

Dr. Weed found no bruises on Nancy's stomach, he testified that a
punch to the stomach would not necessarily leave a bruise (T2. at
104-105).

Dr. Weed requested that Nancy have a pelvic

examination but apparently an exam was not performed (T2. at 103105).
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this
brief,

pertinent to the specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right to

the effective assistance of counsel.

He alleges that counsel's

performance was ineffective but fails to demonstrate, in any of
his allegations, that the deficient performance was a reality as
required by the first prong of the Strickland test.

Even if

defendant had made such a showing, he does not meet the second
prong of the Strickland test, which requires a showing that he
was actually prejudiced by counsel's performance.
The evidence presented at trial, together with all
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendants
convictions for aggravated assault, assault and unlawful
detainer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL.
Defendant appears to claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney's
failure to (1) call certain witnesses, and (2) effectively cross-11-

examine the victim, Nancy Gray.

All of defendant's claims lack

merit and should be summarily rejected.
The accepted standard for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness

claim, a defendant "must show, first, that his or her counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant."

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893

(1989) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
In State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984),
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as
consistent with its previous holdings regarding effective
assistance of counsel.

Ici. at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris,

660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)).

According to Lairby, the burden

of proof lies with the defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness
must be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative matter.
699 P.2d at 1203.

Lairby,

Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the

level of ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not
produce the anticipated result.

Ld.

performance must be prejudicial.

Id.

The deficiency in
See Codianna, 660 P.2d at

1109; State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

To be

prejudicial, there must be a "reasonable probability" that the
outcome would be different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Reasonable probability means a "probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."
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State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d

1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
4 94),

Mere speculatioi i tha ( : an outcome may have been differen t is

not sufficient.

State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah

1987).
A review of the trial record demonstrates that trial
3
counsel was prepared at trial and conducted an able defense.
Further, defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's
allegedly deficient performance.
guilt was overwhelming.

The evidence of defendant's

Based solely on evidence about which

defendant does not complain, a jury could have reasonably
convicted defendant of the crimes charged: aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated assault and assault.

The victim, defendant's wife,

testified that defendant held her captive in their apartment for
approximately 48 hours, during which period of time he assaulted
her with, among other things, a telephone receiver, a .22 Beretta
and other guns, a metal watchband, a cigarette lighter and a one
foot long, three inch wide candle (Tl. at 77-170).

Defendant does

not dispute that he hit Nancy with the telephone receiver and
metal watchband or that he carried a gun the night the assault
began (T3. at 37 and 41).

This evidence, in conjunction with

evidence detailed in Point II of this brief, demonstrates that
there is no reasonable probability the outcome would have been
different absent the alleged errors; thus, defendant fails to

Significantly, defendant was charged with aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony; however, the jury found
defendant guilty of the lesser included offense, unlawful
detention, a class B misdemeanor.
-13-

satisfy the second prong of Strickland,
ineffectiveness claim.

This alone defeats his

See Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.

In any

event, defendant's claims of deficient performance will be
examined individually.
Defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to (1)
contact two alleged alibi witnesses and (2) was deficient in his
cross-examination of the victim, Nancy Gray.

According to

defendant, trial counsel should have called two alibi witnesses:
Joe Hunt and Bill Johnson.

Defendant suggests that "effective

assistance of counsel means counsel should have contacted these
witnesses and secured them for trial."
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 6).

(Brief of Appellant

Defendant's assertions are

speculative, as well as meritless, and reflect a misunderstanding
of the Strickland standard for ineffectiveness claims.
In State v. Crestani, this Court quoted Strickland for
the principle that defense "counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary."

Id. at 1090 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91) (emphasis added).

This Court

determined that the total failure of Crestani's defense counsel to
contact a rebuttal witness indicated a severe deficiency in his
performance because he could not know whether the witness's
testimony would have been helpful or not.

Id. at 1090.

When counsel knows of the existence of a
person or persons who possess information
relevant to his client's defense, and he
fails to use due diligence to investigate
that evidence, such a lack of industry cannot
be justified as "strategic error.". . .

-14-

Id. at 1090 (quoting Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212, 214 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1987)).

Crestani is distinguishable from defendant's

case because defendant's trial counsel, as well as those defense
counsel who represented defendant prior to trial used due
diligence to try and locate defendant's alleged alibi witnesses
4
(R. at 104-108)
Defendant's counsel, unlike Crestani's defense
counsel, ascertained that the alleged alibi witnesses (Hunt and
Johnson) refused to corroborate defendant's story and would not be
5
credible witnesses at trial (R. 105).
Notwithstanding the fact that both Hunt and Johnson
refused to substantiate his story, defendant now asserts on appeal
that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial counsel to call
Hunt and Johnson to testify.

In fact, the opposite is true.

Based on the record before him, it was reasonable for defendant's

Defendant was originally represented by Brooke Wells of the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (SLLDA) (R. at 22).
Defendant apparently objected to his representation by Wells,
whereupon Andrew A. Valdez, also of SLLDA, was appointed to
represent defendant (R. at 30, 48). During the course of a pretrial conference held May 8, 1989, defendant objected to his
continued representation by Valdez (R. at 105). Subsequently,
SLLDA made a motion to withdraw from representation of defendant
due to a conflict of interest between SLLDA and defendant (R. at
93). In a minute entry dated May 25, 1989, Judge Russon appointed
Solomon Chacon to represent defendant at trial (R. at 96).
5
At the pretrial conference on May 8, 1989, defense counsel
(Valdez) informed Judge Russon that an investigator for SLLDA, Ed
Barton, had contacted both Hunt and Johnson in February 1989 and
that both had refused to corroborate or substantiate defendant's
story (R. at 104, 108). Further, defense counsel informed the
court that both Hunt and Johnson had been given SLLDA's phone
number and told to call if they could help at all in defendant's
case and that, as of May 8, neither Hunt nor Johnson had contacted
SLLDA with information (R. at 108-109). Although defendant
claimed to have recently talked to both Hunt and Johnson, defense
counsel replied that he had only been able to recontact Hunt and
that Hunt had again refused to substantiate defendant's story (R.
at 104-107).
-15-

trial counsel not to invest further efforts in locating witnesses
who had previously refused to substantiate defendant's story.
Instead, trial counsel made the most of the situation by providing
defendant with the opportunity at trial to assert that he had
alibi witnesses but had been unable to locate them for trial (T3.
at 52).

Based on the above, it is clear that defendant's counsel

both prior to and during trial used due diligence to investigate
defendant's alleged alibi witnesses and none were forthcoming.
Thus, defendant has failed to show that his defense was deficient
or that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's strategy.
Defendant further asserts that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient during cross-examination of the victim
in two respects:

(1) failing to vigorously cross-examine the

victim concerning alleged inconsistencies between her testimony at
the preliminary hearing and her testimony at trial, and (2)
eliciting testimony concerning previous violent acts of defendant
(Br. of App. at 7).
Defendant's theory of the case was that although he
fought with his wife and threatened to "knock the shit out of
her," he did not harm her to the extent she claimed (T3. at 60).
Defense counsel pursued that theory by cross-examination of the
victim (Tl. at 143-170; T2. at 1-33, 50-51) and others who
testified concerning the extent of her injuries (T2. at 57-64, 67,
97-99, 107-112, 129-30).

Defendant does not indicate on appeal

what counsel could have done to further bolster defendant's theory
in this regard.

Rather, defendant speculates that the victim's

testimony changed from the time of the preliminary hearing to the
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time of trial and that his trial counsel was deficient in not
vigorously cross-examining the victim as to these alleged
inconsistencies.
In support of his argument, defendant merely states
that "the time of detention testified to at preliminary hearing
was much longer than the time testified to at trial" (Br. of App.
at 7).

Even assuming defense counsel was deficient in not

emphasizing this alleged inconsistency during cross-examination of
the victim, defendant has failed to demonstrate any resulting
prejudice.

The exact length of time the victim was detained by

defendant is not a material element of any of the crimes charged
or of which defendant was convicted:

aggravated kidnapping,

aggravated assault, assault, and unlawful detention.
Furthermore, it is an appellant's burden to provide an adequate
record on appeal.

In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886

(Utah 1989); Campbelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d
1239, 1242 (Utah 1987).

See also Utah R. App. P. 11.

Defendant

has not provided this Court with a transcript of the preliminary
hearing or otherwise specified what the alleged inconsistencies in
the victim's testimony might have been.

See State v. Robbins, 709

P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (where defendant failed to provide a
trial transcript on appeal, Utah Supreme Court presumed regularity
in the proceedings below).

See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1988) (court may decline to rule on argument
unsupported by legal analysis or authority).

Thus, defendant has

not demonstrated that trial counsel's performance was deficient or
that he was prejudiced as a result.
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Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was
deficient in cross-examination of the victim when he elicited
testimony concerning previous violent acts by defendant (Br. of
App. at 7-8; T2. at 146-151).

From the record, it is apparent

that trial counsel was attempting to show that the events of
December 6-8, 1989, were merely a series of unfortunate domestic
disputes between newlyweds, not the violent episode of captivity
described by the victim (Tl. at 146-151).

Legitimate choices of

tactics or strategy by an attorney will not normally fall below
the standard of reasonableness.

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,

159-160 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 3270

(1990), State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

See

"[S]trategic choices made after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable."

Id. at 690.

See

Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1090. The Utah Supreme Court has said,
"[t]his Court will not second guess the strategy of counsel at
trial." State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982).

Likewise,

this Court should not second guess trial counsel's strategy in
this case.

By eliciting testimony concerning previous violent

acts of defendant during cross-examination of the victim, trial
counsel was attempting to diffuse her allegations against
defendant.

As in his other claims of ineffectiveness, defendant

has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient or that he was
prejudiced by the alleged deficiency.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial
was not sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §
76-5-103 (1990), which reads:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if
he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury.
The jury was fully advised as to these definitions and each
requisite element of the offense (R. at 213 and 215, Court's
Instructions to the Jury, Instructions No. 17 and 18).
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is well-established:
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) defines assault as
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another.
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the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. . . .
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accord State
Further,

since a jury is in the best position to give "proper weight to the
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony," State v.
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
[i]t is not this court's duty to measure
conflicting evidences or the credibility of
witnesses. That responsibility belongs
strictly to the trier of fact. "It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and to determine the credibility of
the witnesses. So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all requisite elements
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the
court's] inquiry stops." . . .
Id. at 27 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985)).

Accord State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475

(Utah 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly stated that the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim of an assault can be
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant if the
jury finds that testimony sufficiently credible and compelling.
In State v. Archuleta, the court declared:
[T]he principal evidence supporting the
conviction in this case consisted of the
victim's testimony, there being no decisively
corroborating physical evidence. We again
decline to adopt the position that the
testimony of a rape victim, without more,
cannot support a conviction. We are
especially reluctant to do so in a case such
as this, where nothing contradicted the
victim's testimony.
The physical evidence in this case did not
contradict the victim's version of the
events. . . . While the jury could have
-20-

adopted the interpretation of the facts that
defendant advocates on appeal, it did not.
Where evidence lends itself to varying
interpretations, we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the jury.
Id. at 1021-22.
Turning to the facts adduced at trial and their
reasonable inferences, it is clear from the testimony of Nancy
Gray that defendant used a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning
7
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990) to assault her.
Nancy
testified that over the course of 48 hours, December 6-8, 1989,
defendant (1) hit her with a telephone receiver three times; (2)
held the barrel of a .22 Beretta in her mouth twice; (3) flipped a
metal watchband in her eye; (4) held a flaming cigarette lighter
between her legs near her pubic hair; and (5) threatened to shove
a one foot long, three inch wide candle into her vagina (Tl. at
86-122, 160-168; T2. at 2-11, 48). Nancy's testimony was
corroborated in part by defendant, who did not deny hitting Nancy
with the telephone receiver, flipping a metal watchband in her
eye, or having a gun with him during the 48 hour detention (T3. at
37-41, 61 71). Thus, the testimony of the victim was not so
inherently improbable that this Court would be justified in

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990) defines a dangerous weapon as
any item capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury, or a facsimile or
representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use
of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he
is in control of such an item.
-21-

substituting its opinion for that of the jury.

The jurors were

able to observe the witnesses at trial and judge their
credibility.

The jurors also may have made legitimate inferences

about the credibility of the victim from the testimony of Victoria
Marks, Debra Jean Dokos, Dr. Thomas S. Weed and Dennis R. Couch
who all testified concerning the victim's physical and emotional
state (T2. at 53-67, Testimony of Marks; T2. at 72-99, Testimony
of Dokos; T2. at 107-113, Testimony of Weed; T2. at 122-130,
Testimony of Couch).
In addition to the above testimony, Scott Bearden
testified that he helped defendant look for Nancy and her truck
early in the morning of December 9, 1989 and that defendant was
carrying a "pistol" at that time (T2. at 117-121).

When the

evidence is taken as a whole and the proper standard of review
applied, it is clear that there is more than sufficient evidence
to sustain defendant's aggravated assault conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
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